Owing to their hidden natures, covert channels can be utilized such that trojan applications can communicate stealthily with each other or exchange stolen private information without being revealed. To prevent damage incurred by covert channels, researchers have preemptively scrutinized diverse covert channels that can be devised by an attacker. Although covert channels based on sensor data may interest an attacker because sensing operation is a key task in Internet of Things (IoT), we do not find any covert channel studies that adapted the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to sensor data except our prior study [27] , where the SPRT is applied to sensor data in Android systems before an attacker's conception; however, our previous study showed limitations owing to the static nature of the SPRT parameter settings and the method of mapping sensor data to sample types for covert channel creation. To demonstrate that these limitations can be pacified, we propose a covert channel that dynamically applies the SPRT to sensor data in IoT. In our proposed covert channel, stealthy information bit 1 (resp. 0) is encoded to and decoded from a sequence of sensor data when the SPRT with dynamic parameter settings accepts an alternate (resp. null) hypothesis. We implement our proposed covert channel in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices and evaluate it in terms of various metrics. Evaluation results indicate that every encoded stealthy information byte is successfully decoded in our covert channel. Furthermore, 3.513 samples and 28.105 SPRT executions at the most are required for encoding/decoding a stealthy information byte in our devised covert channel on an average, thus resulting in fast encoding/decoding in our covert channel. Finally, our developed covert channel yields a throughput ranging from 4097.5 to 9061.67 bits/sec.
I. INTRODUCTION
As covert channels can be built from diverse types of stealthy methodologies that are discerned by only trojan applications, an attacker can make use of covert channels to veil the communications between trojan applications. Moreover, he can utilize covert channels to send various sensitive information to malicious servers, such as credentials and passwords that are surreptitiously stolen from vulnerable systems. For a long period, researchers have explored a variety of covert channels that can be maliciously exploited by attackers. They have discovered that status bar notifications on wearable devices [11] , a variety of software characteristics and components in The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiaochun Cheng.
Android systems [25] , [35] , [47] , [58] , diverse hardware features and components in Android smartphones [1] , [9] , [40] , various hardware components for air-gapped computers [19] - [22] , cache attacks on ARM-based smartphones [34] , hidden voice commands [6] , ultrasonic and isolated sound in smartphone devices [10] , random number generators [14] , sequence and timing information in network traffic [3] , [4] , [16] , [48] , network protocols [31] , [39] , compressive sensing techniques [59] , and user-behaviors [42] can be leveraged for covert channel creation.
Because various sensor data are frequently collected and processed in IoT, an attacker may be interested in conceiving covert channels based on sensor data. However, despite numerous studies on covert channels, we do not discover any study on covert channels that adapted the Sequential VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) [53] to sensor data except our prior work [27] . This is primarily because the SPRT statistically makes a fast decision with high accuracy concerning various problems, and it is typically employed for defense techniques against various attacks. For instance, it is deployed for port scan detection in the Internet [30] , code-reuse attack detection in industrial IoT devices [28] , mobile replica detection in wireless sensor networks [26] , storage covert channel detection [49] , and web site detection with stego information [41] .
To demonstrate that the SPRT can be exploited by an attacker in contrast to conventional applications of the SPRT to defense mechanisms, we develop a covert channel applying the SPRT to sensor data in Android systems in our prior work [27] . Although [27] is the first work involving a covert channel applying the SPRT to sensor data, it contains static features in terms of the SPRT parameter configurations and the method of mapping sensor data to sample types for covert channel construction, causing an increase in the possibility of a covert channel being revealed. Our current study is highly motivated by how these limitations of our prior study [27] can be mitigated. Hence, we devise a covert channel that is built from the novel and dynamic integration of the SPRT [53] with sensor data in IoT.
More specifically, an encoding IoT device converts incoming sequence of sensor data to a series of byte-data and randomly maps each byte-data to a sample type. Subsequently, it probabilistically selects samples participating in the SPRT with dynamic parameter configurations (abbr. Dynamic-SPRT) and perform the Dynamic-SPRT with randomly chosen samples. If the Dynamic-SPRT adopts an alternate (resp. null) hypothesis, stealthy information bit 1 (resp. 0) is encoded to a sequence of sensor data participating in the acceptance of the alternate (resp. null) hypothesis. Once encoding process is completed, an encoding IoT device sends the sequence of sensor data to a decoding IoT device. A decoding IoT device, which shares seed values for pseudo-random number generation with an encoding IoT device, executes the Dynamic-SPRT while adopting each sensor data from encoding the IoT device as a sample. If the Dynamic-SPRT takes an alternate (resp. null) hypothesis, stealthy information bit 1 (resp. 0) is decoded from a sequence of sensor data participating in the acceptance of the alternate (resp. null) hypothesis. The details of the encoding and decoding processes are described in Section IV.
Moreover, we analyze the method of amending erroneous decisions incurred during the encoding process of the Dynamic-SPRT. The details of analysis are presented in Section V.
Additionally, we examine that a series of identical sensor data will not likely cause failure in the Dynamic-SPRTbased covert channel creation even though it can cause a delay in covert channel creation. Moreover, we explore that guarding against our devised covert channel is challenging although different types of defending mechanisms have been proposed. The details of this discussion are described in Section VI.
Finally, we evaluate our proposed covert channel by implementing it in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices such that an encoding trojan application operates on one device and a decoding trojan application operates on another device. Evaluation results represent that every stealthy information byte encoded by an encoding trojan application is successfully decoded by a decoding trojan application in our developed covert channel. Moreover, we discover that our devised covert channel can quickly encode/decode stealthy information byte with 3.513 samples and 28.105 SPRT executions at the most, on an average. Finally, from our measurements, our proposed covert channel could yield a throughput ranging from 4097.5 to 9061.67 bits/sec. The details of the performance evaluation are explained in Section VII.
A. SUMMARY OF OUR PROPOSED DYNAMIC-SPRT-BASED COVERT CHANNEL
• By reducing the limitations owing to the static nature of our prior study, which is regarded as the first study to adapt the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SRPT) to establish covert channels, we devise the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel in the IoT and evaluate it in terms of various metrics by implementing it in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B.
• In our devised covert channel, stealthy information bit 1 (resp. 0) is encoded to and decoded from a sequence of sensor data when the SPRT with dynamic parameter settings accepts an alternate (resp. null) hypothesis.
• Experimental results demonstrate that every encoded stealthy information byte is successfully decoded with 3.513 samples and 28.105 SPRT executions at the most for encoding/decoding a stealthy information byte on an average, signifying fast encoding/decoding. Moreover, our devised covert channel achieves a throughput ranging from 4097.5 to 9061.67 bits/sec, which is faster than the most of relevant work to be compared.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first explain the work that are directly relevant to covert channel in various systems and present the work that have potential to be used for covert channel creation. We then briefly describe the existing work associated with general IoT security. Finally, we introduce our prior work [27] statically applying the SPRT to sensor data for covert channel construction in Android systems and discuss the limitations of [27] . Denney et al. [11] designed a storage covert channel on wearable devices They leveraged status bar notifications to set up storage covert channel. Carlini et al. [6] looked into hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to human users but understandable to devices. Attacker can use hidden voice commands for covert channel creation by exploiting the characteristic of being indiscernible to human users. Deshotels et al. [10] proposed another work employing inaudible sound as covert channel in smartphone devices. In [10] , ultrasonic and isolated sound are explored as covert channel in smartphone devices. In [34] , cache attacks without any privilege have been demonstrated on non-rooted ARMbased smartphones. Moreover, covert channels with exploiting cache attacks has been implemented in ARM-based smartphones [34] . In [38] , Last Level Caches(LLC) are used for cross-core covert channel establishment. Wu et al. [57] devised a covert channel rooted on the competition on use of memory bus in virtual machines. Evtyushkin et al. [14] developed cover channels based on random number generator. Al-Haiqi et al. [1] utilized vibration motors and accelerometers to create covert channels in android systems. Lalande et al. [33] designed four covert channels hinged on task list and screen, process priority and screen, process priority, pure screen state in Android systems. Novak et al. [40] developed different types of Android covert channels with using physical media. Qi et al. [42] exploited user behavior for covert channel establishment on smartphones. Li et al. [31] proposed four covert channels operating in Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol. They are based on source sequence number field in route request message, lifetime field in route reply message, destination ID filed in route request message, and timing route request message. In [59] , covert data channel utilizing compressive sensing technique has been devised in wireless sensor networks. A variety of covert channels for air-gapped computers have been proposed with using optical effusion [21] , hard disk noise [22] , magnetic signals [36] , electromagnetic emission [20] , thermal maneuver [19] . Heard et al. [25] utilized intent to set up inter-application covert channel in Android system. Chandra et al. [9] find out that battery and phone call can be utilized for interapp covert channel in Android system. Wu et al. [58] devised bidirectional covert channel without requiring permission in Android systems and adopted intent as transmission medium for covert channel. Schlegel et al. [47] developed covert channels rooted on screen, volume settings, vibration settings, and file locks in Android smartphones. Hasan et al. [24] proposed covert channels for mobile devices by leveraging audio, vibration, magnetics, light. Tuptuk and Hailes [51] built up covert channels through attuning transmission power and sensor data in pervasive computing. In [2] , ultrasonic covert channels without permission is developed in Android systems. Moreover, authors in [2] devised a framework in which covert channels are automatically located, discerned, and typified. Marforio et al. [35] implemented several covert channels based on UNIX socket discovery, threads enumeration, intent types, and processor frequency in Android smartphone and evaluated throughput and synchronization time of these covert channels. They showed that the gauged throughput of these covert channels are enough for sensitive information of users to be sent and received. In [37] , vulnerabilities in MEMS gyroscopes to acoustic quiver at particular ultrasonic frequencies have been exploited for imperceptible cross-device tracking without permission in smartphones and smartwatches. Mileva et al. [39] developed a number of covert channels employing Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) in IoT. In Internet, researchers have devised several covert channels exploiting the timing or sequence information in network traffic [3] , [4] , [16] , [48] .
In [13] , authors proposed an attack exploiting speaker and Google Voice Search without permission. This attack has a potential to be used for covert channel establishment. Tu et al. [50] conceived techniques of injecting out-of-band signal into embedded MEMS inertial sensors and counterfeited sensor outputs and the stemmed inertial information through a number of attacks. This work can be potentially utilized for covert channel establishment in smartphones with MEMS inertial sensors. Zhang et al. [60] devised dolphin attacks in which inaudible malicious void commands can be injected into voice controllable system such as Google Now and Apple Siri and take harmful effect on smartphone devices with voice controllable system. In the sense that dolphin attacks leverage ultrasound channels together with the weakness of audio hardware for ultrasonic voice information transmission, they can be regarded as covert channel.
Next, we briefly classify the relevant work in general IoT security to introduce various activities in IoT security field even though these work are not directly related to covert channel. General IoT security work can be categorized as authentication protocols and schemes [12] , [15] , [23] , [32] , [55] , key management and establishment schemes for IoT [8] , [54] , secure time synchronization protocol [44] , game theory based detection method [56] , blockchain based credibility verification method [45] , secure localization [61] , secure access protocols [18] , trust management [5] .
Unlike the aforementioned covert channels, we propose a covert channel based on the SPRT, which has been commonly used for defense method against diverse attacks [26] , [28] , [30] , [41] , [49] , in Android systems [27] . Although our prior work [27] is a new type of covert channel when compared to the existing ones, it has limitations from the perspective that it utilizes static configurations of the SPRT and statically associates sensor data with sample types while not diminishing the negative impact a sequence of identical sensor data on covert channel establishment. Moreover, it needs to customize static mapping of sensor data to sample types in accordance with sensor data types. Our Dynamic-SPRTbased covert channel enhances our prior work [27] by dynamically configuring the parameters of the SPRT, converting sensor data to byte-data and randomly mapping byte-data to samples types. This random mapping will eliminate the necessity for customization in line with sensor data types.
III. MODEL
In this section, we first explain network model under which IoT devices run and then describe attacker model under which our proposed covert channel is built.
A. NETWORK MODEL
From the perspective that sensing phenomenon is one of crucial functionalities in the IoT, we consider IoT devices that VOLUME 7, 2019 perform diverse sensing operations with equipped sensors, process sensor data, and exchange sensor data with other IoT devices. Moreover, we consider a server that collects sensor data from IoT devices and obtains useful information from the gathered sensor data. We assume that each IoT device can sample sensor data at every reasonably short time period. This assumption is rational because sensor data information in the IoT should be collected and processed in a timely manner.
B. ATTACKER MODEL
We assume that an attacker can create trojan applications for covert channel creation and install them into IoT devices without being spotted by the system. This assumption is reasonable from the following perspectives: An attacker can first convert benign applications to trojan applications by injecting the functionalities of covert channel establishment into benign applications. He can then cause users to install trojan applications into IoT devices by deluding them as if trojan applications were benign. To prevent trojan applications from being discerned by static analysis, an attacker can adapt packing, obfuscation, and polymorphism techniques to the covert channel construction parts of trojan applications.
Furthermore, we assume that an attacker can enforce trojan applications to randomly choose sensor data that are seamlessly sampled from IoT devices and transmit the selected data to other trojan applications in other IoT devices to help convert channel construction. Putting it in different way, trojan applications can select sensor data in such a way as to mix up a majority of randomly selected sensor data contributing to covert channel establishment and a minority of one not contributing to covert channel establishment. This assumption is rational because this random selection of sensor data can be achieved as long as sensor data sampling is continuously performed at every reasonably short time period, as described in Section III-A. Furthermore, this random selection of sensor data will result in a decline of the amount of sensor data to be transmitted to IoT devices and server, taking effect as if trojan applications resembled benign applications while diminishing energy consumption.
Once a covert channel is built between two distinct trojan applications executing in two different IoT devices, as shown in Figure 1 , an attacker can enforce two distinct trojan applications to surreptitiously exchange attack control commands via the covert channel. As shown in Figure 2 , he can also enforce a non-master IoT device to convey the looted private data to a master IoT device through a covert channel established between the non-master and master IoT devices, where the master IoT device has capabilities to process a substantial amount of data collected from non-master IoT devices and deliver it to the attacker server.
IV. COVERT CHANNEL ESTABLISHMENT VIA DYNAMIC ADAPTATION OF THE SPRT TO SENSOR DATA
In this section, we describe in detail how the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) [53] is dynamically applied to sensor data to build a covert channel between two distinct trojan applications running in two different IoT devices. The key rationale behind leveraging the SPRT and sensor data for covert channel creation in the IoT is that the SPRT attains a fast decision on diverse problems through lightweight operations and sensor data is one of widely available resources in the IoT, a covert channel can thus be built stealthily at the low overhead of a simple implementation and lightweight energy depletion.
The covert channel construction process comprises the encoding and decoding of stealthy information bits, which are defined as the information exchanged between two distinct trojan applications. This information can be private information stolen from IoT devices or surreptitious attack command and control messages. In order to explain the encoding and decoding processes of stealthy information bits, we consider a trojan application T e running in one IoT device and a trojan application T d running in the other IoT device. T e and T d serve as an encoder and decoder, respectively.
Before installing T e and T d into IoT devices as per the procedure in Section III-B, an attacker first generates a seed value S for a pseudo-random number generator that is commonly placed in both T e and T d ; then, he installs S into both T e and T d . T e and T d use the shared seed value S for the random mapping of a byte-data value to the sample type and dynamic parameter configurations in the SPRT, as will be described in Sections IV-A.1 and IV-A.3, respectively. After a covert channel between T e and T d is established with S, T e can periodically change a seed value S in conformity with the number of stealthy information bits to be encoded and share the changed seed value with T d by sending it to T d through the covert channel. How to make T e share a list of random numbers with T d when T e and T d do not use the same pseudo-random number generator will be discussed in Section VI-E.
The details of the encoding and decoding processes are specified as follows.
A. ENCODING STEALTHY INFORMATION BITS
Before getting into the details of the dynamic adaptation of the SPRT for stealthy information bit encoding, we first briefly introduce the hypotheses and sample types used in the SPRT. In terms of the dynamic adaptation of the SPRT to encode stealthy information bits, the SPRT accepts either a null hypothesis H 0 or an alternate hypotheses H 1 when it terminates, and H 0 and H 1 are associated with encoding stealthy information bit 0 and 1, respectively. Moreover, we have H 0 -sample type and H 1 -sample type contributing to the acceptance of H 0 and H 1 in the SPRT, respectively.
1) BYTE-DATA ACQUISITION AND RANDOM MAPPING TO SAMPLE TYPE
Upon getting a sensor data with d(d ≥ 1) byte size from sensor of IoT device, T e acquires byte-data from sensor data by performing XOR operation with each byte consisting of sensor data. For instance, if T e receives d-byte sensor
Instead of actual sensor data, we use byte-data for encoding stealthy information bits. The main rationale behind this is to perform encoding process in unit of byte and consequently to make it possible for multiple-byte sensor data to be used for encoding process. Furthermore, this byte-data acquisition process needs d XOR operations per sensor data and thus these lightweight XOR operations do not require substantial time and energy consumption. T e repeatedly applies this byte-data acquisition process to a sequence of sensor data that it chooses for stealthy information bit encoding.
Trojan application encoder T e maps each value of bytedata, which has a total 256 values ranging from 0x00 to 0xff, to the sample type chosen uniformly at random out of H 0sample type and H 1 -sample type. Putting it in different way, this random mapping of byte-data's value to sample type is written by:
where j is a value of byte-data such that 0x00 ≤ j ≤ 0xff and f denotes a uniform random mapping function and it is implemented as rand() function in C programming. T e maps a stealthy information bit I = 0 (resp. I = 1) to H 0 (resp. H 1 ) sample type. This static mapping of I to sample type is repeatedly applied to a sequence of stealthy information bits that T e wishes to encode. . ρ h and ρ s are configured such that 0 < ρ s < ρ h < 1. T e repeatedly applies this byte-data selection process to a sequence of stealthy information bits that it wants to encode.
3) DYNAMIC ADAPTATION OF THE SPRT TO ENCODE STEALTHY INFORMATION BITS
Each time the byte-data is chosen from the selection process in Section IV-A.2, trojan application encoder T e runs the SPRT with it. More specifically, we define a Bernoulli random variable V t (t ≥ 1) with using the tth chosen byte-data B * t as follows:
V t is looked upon as a sample in the SPRT. In the SPRT, we have an alternate hypothesis (H 1 ) and a null hypothesis (H 0 ) such that H 1 signifies that the value of a stealthy information bit to be encoded is 1 and H 0 signifies that the value of a stealthy information bit to be encoded is 0. Under the definition that δ is a success probability in the Bernoulli distribution, we have δ = Pr(V t = 1) = 1 − Pr(V t = 0). We also have pre-configured δ 0 and δ 1 (δ 0 < δ 1 ) such that the acceptance likelihoods of H 1 and H 0 grow if δ ≥ δ 1 and δ ≤ δ 0 hold, respectively. Instead of static settings of δ 0 and δ 1 as in our prior work [27] , we dynamically configure them in such a way that δ 0 (resp. δ 1 ) is chosen uniformly at random from the range of [δ min 0 , δ max 0 ] (resp. [δ min 1 , δ max 1 ]). We call the SRPT with dynamic configurations the Dynamic-SPRT.
Let us denote a series of the samples by V 1 , . . . , V l such that l ≥ 1. As specified by the definition of the SPRT [53] , the log-probability ratio O l on l samples is then provided by
We assume that V t is independent and identically distributed because the measurement of each sensor data is likely independent of the one of other sensor data and thus byte-data will be likely regarded as being independent of each other. Under the i.i.d. assumption, we define Y l as the number of times that V t = 1 in the l samples. If trojan application encoder T e wishes to encode stealthy information bit 0 and
holds such that α (resp. β ) is a user-designed false positive rate (resp. a false negative rate), the SPRT accepts H 0 and accordingly stealthy information bit 0 is encoded. If trojan application encoder T e wishes to encode stealthy information bit 1 and Y l ≥
holds, the SPRT accepts H 1 and hence stealthy information bit 1 is encoded.
If T e wishes to encode stealthy information bit 0 (resp. 1) and Y l ≥
the lth sample is withdrawn from the SPRT and the SPRT keeps on with newly incoming samples. The main purpose of the removal of the lth sample from the SPRT is to preclude stealthy information bit from being inaccurately encoded. If all above conditions are not met, the SPRT carries on with newly incoming samples. T e repeatedly applies the above encoding process to a sequence of stealthy information bits.
Once a series of stealthy information bits are encoded, T e transmits T d a sequence of sensor data that is fed into the SPRT for encoding these stealthy information bits. Finally, we summarize the encoding process through Figures 3, 4 . Figure 3 shows how to encode stealthy information bit 1 from byte-data in the Dynamic-SPRT. As shown in Figure 3 , H1-sample type byte-data is selected with higher probability than H0-sample type byte-data, contributing to encoding stealthy information bit 1. Figure 4 shows how to encode stealthy information bit 0 from byte-data in the Dynamic-SPRT. As shown in Figure 4 , H0-sample type byte-data is selected with higher probability than H1-sample type byte-data, leading to encoding stealthy information bit 0.
B. DECODING STEALTHY INFORMATION BITS
Decoder T d decodes stealthy information bits from a sequence of sensor data sent by encoder T e . For decoding process, T d runs the SPRT on the series of sensor data from T e in line with the same sampling procedure, i.i.d. assumption, and configuration parameter values as being employed in Section IV-A.3 of the encoding process. If
holds, the SPRT accepts H 0 and thereby
holds, the SPRT accepts H 1 and thereby stealthy information bit 1 is decoded. If all above conditions are not satisfied, the SPRT runs on with newly incoming samples
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we present an analysis of how to remedy incorrect decision that can be occurred in the course of encoding a stealthy information bit in the Dynamic-SPRT. Lemma 5.1: Suppose that a trojan encoding application T e wants to encode a stealthy information bit 1, but the Dynamic-SPRT accepts H 0 at the lth sample (l ≥ 1). Given l samples, assume that l 1 ≥ 1 is the extra number of samples taken by the Dynamic-SPRT and ψ is the number of H 1 -type samples out of l 1 samples. The Dynamic-SPRT accepts H 1 at the (l − 1 + l 1 )th sample and encodes a stealthy information
Proof: Since the Dynamic-SPRT accepts H 0 at the lth
hold and thus the lth sample should be H 0 -type. Moreover, the lth sample contributes to incorrect decision H 0 and it is thus withdrawn as described in Section IV-A.3. As a result, the number of H 1 -type samples is not changed although the lth sample is pulled out. In order to make the Dynamic-SPRT correct H 1 decision on the (l − 1 + l 1 )th sample, Y l−1+l 1 ≥
should hold. Accordingly, the condition that ψ ≥
Lemma 5.2: Suppose that a trojan encoding application T e wants to encode a stealthy information bit 0, but the Dynamic-SPRT accepts H 1 at the l th sample such that l ≥ 1 
Proof: Recall that the l th sample contributes to incorrect decision H 1 and it is thus taken away as described in Section IV-A.3. In order for the Dynamic-SPRT to make a correct decision H 0 at the (l − 1 + l 0 )th sam-
+ 1 should also hold. Figure 5 shows how l 1 , δ 0 , δ 1 affect the lower bound of ψ for rectifying inaccurate decision H 0 when T e wants to encode a stealthy information bit 1. Figure 6 displays how l 0 , δ 0 , δ 1 affect the upper bound of for rectifying erroneous decision H 1 when T e wants to encode a stealthy information bit 0. For simplicity, we use three cases of (δ 0 , δ 1 ) = (0.2, 0.8), (0.1, 0.9), (0.01, 0.99) that can be randomly chosen by the Dynamic-SPRT. We observe that the lower bound of ψ rises as l 1 grows in Figure 5 . This means that the smaller number of l 1 results in the lower number of H 1 -type samples for amending incorrect decision H 0 , leading to fast remedy of FIGURE 6. The effect of l 0 , δ 0 , δ 1 on the upper bound of for amending erroneous decision H 1 when a trojan encoding application T e wishes to encode a stealthy information bit 0. erroneous decision. We see that the upper bound of increase as l 0 rises in Figure 6 . This indicates that the larger number of l 0 leads to the higher value of in terms of amending incorrect decision H 1 . We also discern that the lower value of δ 0 and the higher value of δ 1 contribute to a decay in the lower bound of ψ. From this observation, we fathom that the lower value of δ 0 and the higher value of δ 1 lead to fast correction of inaccurate decision. On the other hand, we figure out that the lower value of δ 0 and the higher value of δ 1 lead to an increase in the upper bound of . This signifies that the lower value of δ 0 and the higher value of δ 1 result in the accommodation for the higher value of .
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first look into the effect of a series of identical sensor data on covert channel establishment and then make discussion on the use of sensor data bytes for stealthy information transfer. Subsequently, we explore how our proposed covert channel fulfills communication in practical IoT platforms and examine the implementation compatibility of our devised covert channel in distinct types of IoT systems. Finally, we discuss challenges in defense against our covert channel based on the Dynamic-SPRT.
A. IMPACT OF A SERIES OF IDENTICAL SENSOR DATA ON COVERT CHANNEL CREATION
A series of identical sensor data may hinder covert channel from being established because it generates a sequence of equal sample types and hence degrades the diversity of sample types, leading to a delay in the Dynamic-SPRT-based convert channel establishment. However, it will not cause the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel formation to fail as the lessening parameter λ explained in Section IV-A.2 is crucial in exponentially decaying the chance that identical sensor VOLUME 7, 2019 data are chosen for the Dynamic-SPRT as the amount of consecutive identical sensor data increases.
B. USE OF SENSOR DATA BYTES FOR STEALTHY INFORMATION TRANSFER
The main rationale for utilizing a series of sensor data bytes for stealthy information bit transmission is to reduce the likelihood that stealthy information bits are revealed. For instance, if a single bit is used for encoding/decoding a single stealthy information bit, the brute-force search space for revealing stealthy information bit will be 2. However, if k(k >= 1) sensor data bytes are used for encoding/decoding a single stealthy information bit in our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel, the brute-force search space for revealing stealthy information bit will be 2 8k . Hence, it is more difficult to disclose a single stealthy information bit in our proposed covert channel than a singlebit-based covert channel. Although a single-bit-based covert channel outperforms our proposed covert channel in terms of stealthy information transmission delay, it is worthwhile to enhance the covertness at the cost of stealthy information transmission delay.
C. COMMUNICATION IN PRACTICAL IOT PLATFORMS
Although our proposed Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel is implemented and evaluated in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B in the study, it is generally designed for any IoT devices equipped with sensing, communication, and computing capabilities; thus, it can be deployed in IoT devices including Samsung's SmartThings. For covert channel establishment, a trojan encoding application in one IoT device transmits a sequence of sensor data, to which stealthy information bits are encoded through the Dynamic-SPRT, to a trojan decoding application in another IoT device. A trojan decoding application decodes stealthy information bits from a sequence of sensor data through the Dynamic-SPRT. Consequently, an attacker can install trojan encoding and decoding applications into practical IoT platforms by exploiting their vulnerabilities and build covert channels through which trojan encoding and decoding applications communicate with each other. It is noteworthy that trojan encoding and decoding IoT applications can be any IoT applications into which covert channel setup functionalities can be crafted by an attacker.
D. IMPLEMENTATION CAPABILITY IN DISTINCT TYPES OF IOT SYSTEMS
In our proposed Dynamic-SPRT-based covet channel, stealthy information bit 1 (resp. 0) is encoded to and decoded from a sequence of sensor data measured by IoT devices when the SPRT with dynamic parameter settings accepts an alternate (resp. null) hypothesis. Accordingly, the key implementation requirements of our proposed covert channel are to implement the Dynamic-SPRT and to dynamically adapt the SPRT to a series of sensor data in IoT devices. Although we implement the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices, the aforementioned key implementation requirements can be readily applied to any IoT devices with sensing, communication, and computation functionalities, because these requirements are not specifically designed for Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices, but rather generally designed for any IoT devices. Therefore, our proposed covert channel can readily fulfill the implementation compatibility.
E. CHALLENGE IN DEFENSE AGAINST THE DYNAMIC-SPRT-BASED COVERT CHANNEL
We first introduce the relevant studies regarding covert channel detection and then explain how our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel can evade the existing detection schemes. Finally, we discuss the challenges in defending against the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel.
Cabuk [3] , [4] and Gianvecchio and Wang [17] performed covert channel detection by leveraging the intuition that covert channel traffic exhibits different characteristics to normal traffic in the Internet. Patel et al. [41] proposed an architecture to detect web sites with stego information using the SPRT. In [49] , the SPRT is leveraged to detect storage covert channel from the viewpoint of a nonactive attacker. Qi et al. [43] developed two alleviation techniques against a user-behavior-based covert channel [42] in Android smartphones. The first technique is to use sensor virtualization, in which non-system applications do not obtain sensor data simultaneously, thus resulting in synchronization failure between non-system applications for user-behaviorbased covert channel establishment. The second technique is to dynamically maintain the sampling frequency of sensors. By leveraging the intuition that benign applications will likely access sensors for a sporadic and short period while malign applications participating in user-behaviorbased covert channel creation will likely require a continuous and long access on sensors, the dynamic sampling frequency of sensors will likely render it more difficult for malicious applications to build a user-behavior-based covert channel.
In [52] , local covert channels in Android smartphones are identified by the process activity correlation technique, which leverages the fact that malicious processes participating in efficient covert channel creation are likely to be active simultaneously. In [7] , an AI-based mechanism is proposed to detect malicious applications communicating through covert channels in Android systems. The proposed mechanism discerns covert channel communications by verifying whether the difference between actual and predicted energy consumption through neural networks goes beyond a threshold, and by utilizing the energy behavior characterization of device through decision trees.
However, these aforementioned schemes cannot be used to defend against the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel. The detection schemes proposed in [3] , [4] , [17] cannot be directly applied for the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel detection because the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel does not utilize sequence or timing information in sensor data traffic but dynamically tailors the SPRT to sensor data value. The architecture proposed in [41] is used to detect web sites with stego information, and the scheme in [49] presents a theoretical solution for storage covert channel detection problems, where how real storage covert channels can be practically spotted is not specified. Hence, the defense strategies in both [41] and [49] cannot be applied to detect the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel. The process correlation activity technique in [52] can be adapted to the detection of covert channels between internal processes among same smartphones but is not suitable for the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert detection because the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel is used in a pair of distinct devices such that an encoder operates in one device and a decoder operates in another device.
The alleviation techniques proposed in [42] are not appropriate for the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel detection. This is because the sensor virtualization technique aims to prevent covert channel construction within one device, not device-to-device covert channel establishment as in the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel. As sensor data sampling frequency is decreased under the dynamic sampling frequency technique, the collection of sensor data required for encoding and decoding processes will likely be time consuming, thus diminishing the throughput of the Dynamic-SPRTbased covert channel. However, the encoding and decoding processes of the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel are performed in accordance with sensor data type; consequently, the dynamic sampling frequency technique will not be able to discern the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel.
Trojan applications participating in the Dynamic-SPRTbased covert channel creation perform normal functionality and encoding and decoding operations. Although the Dynamic-SPRT for encoding and decoding operations requires lightweight energy dissipation, they likely deplete more energy than benign applications without these operations. Hence, the mechanism proposed in [7] can likely detect the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel. However, an intelligent version of the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel could elude the detection mechanism in [7] . More specifically, an attacker can adapt the AI-based mechanism of [7] to trojan applications participating in the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel and allow trojan applications to intelligently control their energy consumption. This process can be performed offline. As long as trojan applications can intelligently diminish their energy consumption by reducing encoding and decoding operations and hence enabling the difference between the actual and predicted energy consumption of trojan applications to be less than a threshold, the detection mechanism in [7] will fail to spot the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel, even though the throughput of the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel will be lessened.
In addition to the aforementioned elusion from the existing defense schemes, we deliberate the fundamental challenges that make it difficult for the defense against the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel to attain success.
First, it is difficult to capture distinct characteristics in the sensor data traffic employed for covert channel establishment; therefore, it is hard to ascertain the presence of a covert channel by leveraging the sensor data traffic pattern. This is primarily because encoding process randomly chooses and mixes up a majority of sensor data contributing to covert channel setup and a minority of sensor data not contributing to covert channel setup; hence, the sensor data traffic for covert channel creation will not likely exhibit specific patterns. Furthermore, the method to manage a series of identical sensor data for covert channel setup is similar to the normal sensor data selection process because the likelihood that the same sensor data is selected in that series will become lower as the number of equal sensor data increases in that series.
Next, the Dynamic-SPRT utilizes dynamic parameter configurations for encoding a series of sensor data to stealthy information bits and decoding stealthy information bits from a series of sensor data. Consequently, this dynamic nature of the Dynamic-SPRT renders it difficult for a third party, which is neither an encoder nor decoder, to reversely infer stealthy information bits from a series of sensor data.
Finally, we consider a light defense against the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel as follows. Recall that both the encoder and decoder use the same pseudo-random number generator, and that they share a seed value S for the random mapping of the byte-data value to the sample type and dynamic parameter configurations in the SPRT. Therefore, defenders can enforce each IoT device to have its own distinct pseudo-random number generator. This will not cause the encoder to share a list of random numbers for the aforementioned purpose with a decoder even though the seed value S is shared, thus resulting in failure to create a covert channel. However, an attacker can evade this light defense by computing a list of random numbers and installing it in both the encoder and decoder while not employing a pseudo-random number generator. An encoder can periodically change that list in accordance with number of stealthy information bits to be encoded and share it with a decoder by sending it through a covert channel.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to evaluate our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel, we implement it with using C language on Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices [46] which are widely used in IoT, and assess various characteristics of it. We present the environments and results of our assessment in the subsequent sections.
A. EVALUATION ENVIRONMENTS
To evaluate our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel, we employ two Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices such that an encoding trojan application T e runs on one device and a decoding trojan application T d runs on another device. These two Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices are associated with NetGear's wireless AP and thus T e sends sensor data to VOLUME 7, 2019 T d through a wireless LAN. Moreover, we access these two devices through the ssh program on an iMac.
For a more accurate evaluation, we utilize humidity sensor dataset gathered from 54 sensors employed in the Intel Berkeley Research Laboratory [29] instead of garnering sensor data from our Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices. It is noteworthy that any type of sensor data can be used for covert channel setup, and that the humidity sensor data are selected representatively among various types of sensor data. Furthermore, the humidity sensor data indicate the temperature-rectified relative humidity; thus, the values should range from 0 to 100. Hence, we extract only humidity sensor data falling within the normal range from the original humidity sensor dataset of [29] . More specifically, the humidity sensor data of [29] comprise floating-point numbers; thus, they are represented as double-type variables in the C language, occupying 8 bytes in the memory region of Raspberry Pi 3 Model B. The humidity sensor data of double-type are treated as 8-byte data, and they are converted to byte-data through the procedure specified in Section IV-A.1.
For the purpose of evaluation, T e randomly selects 1-byte stealthy information in such a way that each bit of it is chosen uniformly at random from 0 and 1. It then encodes the chosen 1-byte stealthy information to a series of humidity sensor data and sends that series of humidity sensor data to T d , which decodes 1-byte stealthy information from it. T e and T d repeat these 1-byte stealthy information encoding and decoding processes 1000 times, eventually transferring 1000-byte stealthy information from T e to T d . For these processes, both T e and T d initially shares the same seed value 1000. The shared seed value is incremented by 1000 each time a 1-byte stealthy-information encoding/decoding process is performed.
Each encoding process of 1-byte stealthy information is performed with 500 humidity sensor data. Thus, 500,000 humidity sensor data are employed for 1000-byte stealthy information encoding. The rationale behind this setting is to prepare for the case where all 500 humidity sensor data are utilized for 1-byte stealthy information encoding. It is noteworthy that humidity sensor data are utilized only until 1-byte stealthy information encoding is completed. As 500 is the maximum number of humidity sensor data for 1-byte stealthy information encoding, the actual number of humidity sensor data for it, which will be presented in the following section VII-B, will be substantially less than 500. Because T e randomly determines 1-byte stealthy information for its transmission, 1000 repeats of 1-byte stealthy information transfer takes effect of exploring various features of the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel built for 1000-byte stealthy information transmission.
Although our prior work [27] is only SPRT-based covert channel, it is not reasonable to directly compare [27] to the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel because [27] statically links sensor data to sample types in the SPRT with fixed configuration parameters while not reducing the negative impact a series of identical sensor data on covert channel setup. Hence, we compare our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel to the Static-SPRT-based covert channel, which makes use of the SPRT with static configuration parameters but shares all other functionalities with the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel. As a result, the Static-SPRT-based covert channel can be regarded as an enhanced version of [27] . In similar way to implementation of the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel, we implement the Static-SPRT-based covert channel in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices.
As far as the configuration parameters of the Dynamic-SPRT is concerned, we set α = β = 0.01. Additionally, we configure ρ s = 0.1 and ρ h = 0.9. We consider four configuration groups I, II, III, IV as follows: In configuration group I and II, we set (δ min
In configuration group III and IV, we set (δ min 0 = 0.01, δ max 0 = 0.1), (δ min 1 = 0.9, δ max 1 = 0.99). In configuration group I and III, we set λ = 0.05. In configuration group II and IV, we set λ = 0.1. Table 1 summarizes the configuration group parameters.
The main rationale behind this setup of configuration group is to scrutinize how λ and (δ min 0 , δ max 0 ), (δ min 1 , δ max 1 ) affect the performance of the Dynamic-SPRT and the Static-SPRT. More specifically, we explore increasing effect of λ when the values of (δ min 0 , δ max 0 ) and (δ min 1 , δ max 1 ) are fixed. We also investigate decaying effect of (δ min 0 , δ max 0 ) and rising effect of (δ min 1 , δ max 1 ) when the value of λ is fixed. Recall that δ 0 and δ 1 are selected uniformly at random from the range of [δ min 0 , δ max 0 ] and [δ min 1 , δ max 1 ], respectively. Table 1 .
B. EVALUATION RESULTS
We make use of evaluation metrics as displayed in Table 2 . Although a 8-byte humidity sensor data is converted to byte-data for encoding/decoding process, original data bytes are used as basic unit for the second and the fourth metrics in Table 2 . We attain each metric as the average of the results for 1000 repeat of 1-byte stealthy information transfer. For simplicity, we call the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel (resp. Static-SPRT-based covert channel) the Dynamic-SPRT (resp. Static-SPRT) in the rest of evaluation results.
In all configuration groups in the Dynamic-SPRT and the Static-SPRT, every stealthy information byte encoded by T e is successfully decoded by T d . As presented in Figure 7 , as far number of samples in the SPRT as concerned, the Dynamic-SPRT performs encoding/decoding operation with less average number of samples in the SPRT than the Static-SPRT. In particular, the Dynamic-SPRT requires at most 3.513 samples for encoding/decoding operation on an average while the Static-SPRT needs at most 4.406 samples on an average. This means that encoding/decoding operation is quickly processed in the Dynamic-SPRT while outperforming the Static-SPRT. In addition, an average number of samples in the SPRT tends to decrease as configuration group number increases. This indicates that the lower values of (δ min 0 , δ max 0 ) and the higher values of (δ min 1 , δ max 1 ) lead to decay of an average number of samples in the SPRT. It signifies that the lower value of δ 0 and the higher value of δ 1 contribute to the lower average number of samples in the SPRT.
From Figure 8 , we see that the Dynamic-SPRT outperforms the Static-SPRT in terms of average number of original data bytes for encoding a stealthy information byte. In particular, the Dynamic-SPRT completes encoding operation with number of data bytes ranging from 72.6% to 81.3% of the one consumed in the Static-SPRT on an average. The Dynamic-SPRT requires the number of bytes stretching from 389.816 to 575.728 for encoding a stealthy information byte on an average. Namely, the number of data bytes that are taken as samples in encoding operation of the Dynamic-SPRT plus the number of ones not taken as samples are below 576 on an average. From the perspective that each humidity data with double-type occupies 8 bytes, the Dynamic-SPRT actually performs a stealthy information byte encoding with below 72 humidity data. Therefore, the actual number of data used for encoding 1000 stealthy information bytes out of 500,000 humidity data is below 72,000. An average number of bytes in the SPRT tends to lessen as configuration group number rises. From this observation, we perceive that the lower value of δ 0 and the higher value of δ 1 are conducive to the smaller average number of bytes for encoding operation. Figure 9 shows how many times the SPRT is executed for encoding/decoding a stealthy information byte on an average. We recognize that the number of the SPRT runs for encoding/decoding operation in the Dynamic-SPRT varies from 69.3% to 79.7% of the one in the Static-SPRT on an average. In particular, the Dynamic-SPRT encodes/decodes a stealthy information byte with number of SPRT executions stretching from 17.911 to 28.105 on an average. This indicates that encoding/decoding operation in the Dynamic-SPRT is quickly processed through small number of the SPRT executions. As configuration group number grows, an average number of the SPRT runs reduces. From this phenomenon, we discern that the smaller average number of the SPRT executions for encoding/decoding operation is incurred by the lower value of δ 0 and the higher value of δ 1 . Figure 10 displays how many original data bytes are needed to deliver an encoded stealthy information byte from T e to T d . We observe that the number of data bytes for an encoded stealthy information byte delivery in the Dynamic-SPRT stretches from 70.15% to 80.3% of the one in the Static-SPRT on an average. In specific, the Dynamic-SPRT needs number of data bytes ranging from 151.096 to 232.808 for an encoded stealthy information byte delivery on an average. This means that the number of data bytes sent from T e to T d is at most 232.808 for an encoded stealthy information byte and thus at most 232,808 data bytes are delivered from T e to T d for 1000 encoded stealthy information bytes on an average. We also notice that an average number of data bytes for the encoded stealthy information byte delivery tends to increase as configuration group number swells. We infer from this that the smaller average number of data bytes for delivery is caused by the higher value of δ 1 and the lower value of δ 0 . By comparing the results of Figure 10 to the ones of Figure 8 , we grasp that an average number of data bytes for delivery varies from 38.76% to 40.44% of an average number of data bytes for encoding operation in the Dynamic-SPRT.
In case that two configuration groups have the same values of (δ min 0 , δ max 0 ) and (δ min 1 , δ max 1 ), we recognize that an increase in λ contributes to reduction in the values of the above four metrics. This is mainly because the higher value of λ will likely make the lower chance that a series of identical sensor data is selected as sample in the Dynamic-SPRT.
Evaluation results of the above four metrics exhibit the common characteristic that the result gap between configuration group I and II and the one between III and IV are not considerable while the gap between the results of (I, II) and the ones of (III, IV) is substantial. This implies that a decline in (δ min 0 , δ max 0 ) and a rise in (δ min 1 , δ max 1 ) more substantially affect the evaluation results than an increase in λ.
As shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 , we discern that the overall pattern of frequency distribution of byte-data values ranging from 0 to 255 in the Dynamic-SPRT with configuration group I resembles the one with configuration group IV, even though most of their frequency values do not match with each other. In both cases of the Dynamic-SPRT with configuration group I and IV, we observe that the frequencies of byte-data values are not uniformly distributed. Accordingly, we fathom that a stealthy information byte is encoded with byte-data values with non-uniform frequency distribution. Finally, we present the comparison results between our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel and existing non-SPRT-based covert channels in terms of throughput and robustness.
We define throughput as the number of stealthy information bits received by a trojan decoder per second, in units of bits/sec. It is noteworthy that time of Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices is synchronized to the NTP server in UTC time, where the NTP server is often changed. Moreover, we measure the throughput using program codes that are directly used in stealthy information delivery from a trojan encoder to a trojan decoder. Table 3 shows the throughput measured in our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel and the related work. As shown in Table 3 , our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel achieves the higher throughput than most of the compared work, even though [14] fulfills a higher throughput than our proposed covert channel; the throughput range of [9] includes the one of our proposed covert channel, and the high portion of throughput range in [35] overlaps the low portion of our proposed covert channel. This signifies that our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel can process a substantial amount of stealthy information for covert communication.
We define robustness as the fraction of number of stealthy information bits correctly decoded by a trojan decoder to the one correctly encoded by a trojan encoder. Table 4 shows the robustness measured in our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel and the related work. As shown in Table 4 , our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel exhibits strong robustness when compared to other related work. This means that every stealthy information bit is correctly encoded and decoded in our devised covert channel. The main rationale behind separating comparison of our proposed covert channel to the SPRT-based covert channel from that to the non-SPRT-based covert channels is as follows: we utilize throughput and robustness metrics for the comparison between the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel and existing non-SPRT-based covert channels because our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel exhibits a nature that is distinct from non-SPRT-based covert channels. On the other hand, we employ four other metrics for the comparison between the Dynamic-SPRT-based and the Static-SPRTbased covert channels because these SPRT-based covert channels share the similar nature of harnessing the SPRT and sensor data for covert channel setup.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel in IoT. In our devised covert channel, stealthy information bit 0 (resp. 1) is encoded to and decoded from a sequence of sensor data when the Dynamic-SPRT accepts a null (resp. alternate) hypothesis. Additionally, we analyze how to rectify inaccurate decision that can be taken place in encoding process of the Dynamic-SPRT. We also discuss how a sequence of identical sensor data affects our designed covert channel setup and how guarding against the Dynamic-SPRTbased covert channel is challengeable. Finally, we implement our Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices and perform evaluation of it by comparing it to the Static-SPRT-based covert channel implemented in Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices. Evaluation results demonstrate that every encoded stealthy information byte is successfully decoded in both the Dynamic-SPRT-based and the Static-SPRT-based covert channels, and the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel outperforms the Static-SPRTbased covert channel in terms of various evaluation metrics. In particular, the Dynamic-SPRT-based covert channel performs encoding/decoding operation for a stealthy information byte with 3.513 samples and 28.105 SPRT executions at the most on an average, contributing to fast encoding/decoding in covert channel. In addition, our developed covert channel achieves a throughput ranging from 4097.5 to 9061.67 bits/sec.
